经济学人

（接上文） Money mountains That is over twice what the global venture-capital industry spends each year. It is 51 times the annual cash burned up by Netflix, Uber and Tesla, three firms famous for being cash hungry. And it is 37 times the average annual amount of cash the five firms have in total spent on acquisitions to gain new technologies and products, such as Facebook"s $19bn purchase of WhatsApp, a messaging service in2014, or Google"s $3.1bn acquisition of DoubleClick, an advertising firm, in 2007. Might these firms hoard cash just because they are run by megalomaniacs who are too rich and odd to obey any rules? That seems glib and out of date. Apple and Microsoft are no longer controlled by their founders. Those behind Alphabet were pragmatic enough in 2015 to appoint Ruth Porat, the former finance boss of Morgan Stanley, as its chief financial officer, to instil more discipline. Jeff Bezos"s interest is arguably for Amazon to pay a dividend—in the absence of one he is selling $1bn of his shares every year to raise cash to finance his space-rocket firm. Maybe if the tax code is reformed the great cash build up will end. The most mature firms, Apple and Microsoft, would make a large one-off return of cash to shareholders. Amazon, Alphabet and Facebook would adopt sensible frameworks for returning cash to shareholders as their profits soar. But perhaps these firms love their giant insurance policy. Imperious on the outside, inside they may worry about obsolescence and regulation. Anti-trust authorities are getting hostile. Only five years ago Facebook and Google were struggling with the shift from desktops to devices. Both depend on advertising for over 85% of sales. Apple"s health depends on its latest iPhone, Amazon has thin margins and Microsoft"s profits have yet to rise. If earnings do soar as forecast, the big-five tech firms could be plotting giant acquisitions of media, car or hardware firms, to diversify away from their core business. But they may simply be uneasy that profits will not rise as high as Wall Street now expects. Either way, the $330bn safety blanket that lets Silicon Valley sleep at night should lead investors to keep one eye open. ■一句一练■ Apple"s health depends on its latest iPhone,……

The yuan is still a long way from being a free-floating currency. It is further away still from being a global one to rival the dollar.It is not a straightforward business to buy and sell yuan. Traders joke that it is less liquid than the shares of Alibaba, a giant Chinese e-commerce firm, which is listed in New York. Yet despite the constraints, the waxing and waning of the yuan"s value has had a growing influence on the foreign-exchange market and on asset prices more generally. 这是《经济学人》8月刊的一篇文章"The meaning of seven"第5段，共有3句。 1、 {"rival":"与...相匹配，比得上"} {"straightforward":"adj.简单的，容易的"} 这句话顺着翻译就好： 人民币距离成为完全浮动汇率货币还有很长的路要走，从一个国际货币之一到与美元分庭抗礼依然有很长一段路要走，对于交易人民币业务来说并不是容易的。 2、 {"commerce":"商业、贸易"} 这句话核心就是前半句，"that"介绍joke的内容，整句话试着翻译： 交易者开玩笑道：人民币的流通性还不如阿里巴巴公司的股票，一家备案在纽约的中国的电子商业巨头公司。 3、 {"constraints":"n.约束，限制"} waxing and waning ：消长变化，盈亏 直接翻译： 尽管（人民币）受到限制，但是人民币价值的消长变化（涨跌）在国外外汇市场以及普遍的资产价格中的影响力在与日剧增。 总结： 词汇部分 {"rival":"与...相匹配，比得上"} {"straightforward":"adj.简单的，容易的"} {"commerce":"商业、贸易"} {"constraints":"n.约束，限制"} waxing and waning ：消长变化，盈亏

https://frankzhougq.github.io/article/TE-2019-04-19/ privately held tech firms worth over $1bn that are supposedly strong and world-beating —miraculous almost. 第一流的 It will be America"s third-biggest-ever tech IPO, after Alibaba and Facebook. Uber In China, an IPO wave that began last year rumbles on . armies of users 大批的 They and their venture-capital (VC) backers VC支持者 There is, however, a problem with the unicorns: their business models . 商业模式 posted combined losses of $14bn last year. 披露损失 ride-hailing 打车，ride-hailing app The justification for this is the Silicon Valley doctrine of “ blitzscaling ” in order to conquer “winner-takes-all” markets 闪电式扩张；赢者通吃 conducting a high-speed land grab in the hope of finding gold. 抢地掘金 building firms and commercialising ideas. Low interest rates left investors chasing returns. untold riches using piles of money to speed up the process. have large user bases . 用户基础 outsourcing their IT to cloud providers. 外包 fight other richly funded rivals 资金雄厚的对手 is going head-to-head with Apple. the unicorns" markets are contested , 竞争很激烈 And without deep moats around their businesses a permanent question-mark hangs over the unicorns 比喻用的好，护城河，也就是行业壁垒 The earlier generation of firms did not face many rules—few legislators had imagined the internet—so they could charge ahead first and beg forgiveness later . 有道理 Airbnb sidestepped taxes on hotels and Uber drove through regulations on taxi-licensing. 例子 Today a reaction is in full swing investor circulars 投资者通告 Investors, meanwhile, need to hold their nerve. 紧绷神经 most unicorns cap outside investors" voting rights (Uber is an exception), and many have “poison pills” too, making takeovers hard and constraining investors" ability to intervene if the firms do not eventually find a way to make enough profits to justify their IPO valuations. 保证管理权的独立性

YOU have multiple jobs, whether you know it or not. Most begin first thing in the morning, when you pick up your phone and begin generating the data that make up Silicon Valley"s most important resource. That, at least, is how we ought to think about the role of data-creation in the economy, according to a fascinating new economics paper. We are all digital labourers, helping make possible the fortunes generated by firms like Google and Facebook, the authors argue. If the economy is to function properly in the future—and if a crisis of technological unemployment is to be avoided—we must take account of this, and change the relationship between big internet companies and their users. 无论你是否知道，其实你身兼数职。大部分开始于早晨你做的第一件事——拿起手机，开始产生数据，而这是硅谷最重要的资源。一篇新发表的 有趣的 经济学论文表示，至少我们应该这样来衡量创造数据对经济所起的作用。文章作者认为，我们都是数字化的劳工，帮助谷歌和脸书这样的大企业创造财富。如果未来经济要 正常运转 ，并且避免技术性失业危机的发生，我们必须要考虑这一点，改变大型互联网企业和用户之间的关系。 Artificial intelligence (AI) is getting better all the time, and stands poised to transform a host of industries , say the authors (Imanol Arrieta Ibarra and Diego Jiménez Hernández, of Stanford University, Leonard Goff, of Columbia University, and Jaron Lanier and Glen Weyl, of Microsoft). But, in order to learn to drive a car or recognisea face, the algorithms that make clever machines tick must usually be trained on massive amounts of data. Internet firms gather these data from users every time they click on a Google search result, say, or issue a command to Alexa. They also hoover up valuable data from users through the use of tools like reCAPTCHA, which ask visitors to solve problems that are easy for humans but hard for AIs, such as deciphering text from books that machines are unable to parse. That does not just screen out malicious bots, but also helps digitise books. People “pay” for useful free services by providing firms with the data they crave . 文章作者们(斯坦福大学的伊马诺尔·阿列塔·伊巴拉和迭戈希·门尼斯·埃尔南德斯、哥伦比亚大学的伦纳德·勒戈夫以及微软公司的杰伦u2022拉尼尔和格伦u2022外尔)一致认为， 人工智能（AI）技术日趋完善，势必将为多个行业带来变革 。但是，为了学习驾驶汽车或是进行面部识别，计算机必须通过算法来进行训练，而训练中就要使用大量的数据。每当用户点击谷歌搜索结果或是在Alexa上下达指令的时候，互联网公司都会收集这些数据。互联网公司同样使用工具，如使用验证码，从用户获取有价值的数据，要求访问者解决对于人类来说轻而易举但对于AI来说却非常困难的问题，例如解析书上的文字，这对于机器来说是不可能的。这不仅能够筛选出恶意的网络机器人，还能帮助将图书转为数字形式。人们向互联网公司提供了他们渴望的数据，以此来换取的免费网络服务。 These data become part of the firms" capital, and, as such, a fearsome source of competitive advantage. Would-be startups that might challenge internet giants cannot train their AIs without access to the data only those giants possess. Their best hope is often to be acquired by those very same titans, adding to the problem of uncompetitive markets. 这些数据成为企业资本的一部分，因此也是竞争优势的可怕来源。那些有可能挑战互联网巨头的初创公司，由于无法获得这些被垄断的数据，因而无法训练他们的人工智能。他们最大的希望就是被同业互联网巨头收购，加重了市场的垄断程度。 That, for now, AI"s contributions to productivity growth are small, the authors say, is partly because of the free-data model, which limits the quality of data gathered. Firms trying to develop useful applications for AI must hope that the data they have are sufficient, or come up with ways to coax users into providing them with better information at no cost. For example, they must **pester **random people—like those blur-deciphering visitors to websites—into labelling data, and hope that in their annoyance and haste they do not make mistakes. 文章作者认为，目前人工智能对于生产率增长的贡献还很小，部分原因在于免费数据的模式限制了数据的质量。如果互联网公司想要开发更有用的人工智能程序，他们一定希望能取得足够的数据，或者想方设法哄骗用户，免费获得更好的用户信息。例如，他们会随意骚扰随机用户——比如识别模糊验证码的网站访问者，进行数据标注，希望他们在不胜其扰的情况下也不会犯错误。 Even so, as AI improves, the amount of work made vulnerable to displacement by technology grows, and ever more of the value generated in the economy accrues to profitable firms rather than workers. As the authors point out, the share of GDP paid out to workers in wages and salaries—once thought to be relatively stable—has already been declining over the past few decades. 即便如此，随着人工智能技术的进步，越来越多的工作岗位将更容易被取代，而在经济发展中产生的价值则会越来越多地落到公司的口袋，而非惠及普通员工。正如作者所指出，在过去的几十年里，工人的工资和薪金占GDP的份额——一度被认为是相对稳定的，在逐年下降。 To tackle these problems, they have a radical proposal. Rather than being regarded as capital, data should be treated as labour—and, more specifically, regarded as the property of those who generate such information, unless they agree to provide it to firms in exchange for payment. In such a world, user data might be sold multiple times, to multiple firms, reducing the extent to which data sets serve as barriers to entry. Payments to users for their data would help spread the wealth generated by AI. Firms could also potentially generate better data by paying. Rather than guess what a person is up to as they wander around a shopping centre, for example, firms could ask individuals to share information on which shops were visited and which items were viewed, in exchange for payment. Perhaps most ambitiously, the authors muse that data labour could come to be seen as useful work, conferring the same sort of dignity as paid employment: a desirable side-effect in a possible future of mass automation. 为了解决这些问题，他们提出了一个非常激进的建议。 数据不应被视为一种资本，而应当作为一种劳动，更确切地说，应该作为创造这些信息的人的财产，除非他们同意向企业有偿提供这些信息。在这种情况下，用户的数据可能会被多次出售给不同的公司，同时也能够降低作为入门门槛的数据收集难度。对用户的数据付费有助于扩散人工智能创造的财富。企业也将有可能通过付费获得质量更好的数据。 例如，当一个人在商场闲逛时，商家可以不用去猜测这个人在干什么，而可以通过付费的方式要求个人分享诸如他逛了哪些商店，看了哪些商品之类的信息。而作者大胆地设想，在不久的将来，数据劳动也能够被当成是一种有价值的工作，并且能够获得与有薪工作同样的尊严，而这正是未来可能的大规模自动化带来的一种好的副作用。 The authors" ideas need fleshing out; their paper, thought-provoking though it is, runs to only five pages. Parts of the envisioned scheme seem impractical. Would people really be interested in taking the time to describe their morning routine or office habits without a substantial monetary **inducement **(and would their data be valuable enough for firms to pay a substantial amount)? Might not such systems attract data mercenaries, spamming firms with useless junk data simply to make a quick buck? 从目前来看，作者的想法需要充实，他们的文章尽管 发人深省 ，但是全文仅仅只有5页。部分设想看上去不太实际。在没有足够大金钱利益驱动下，人们真的会有兴趣去花时间记录自己的日常习惯或者是办公习惯吗（或是用户数据的价值是否足以使企业去支付大量的费用）？这样的体系下是不是会吸引大批唯利是图，企图通过垃圾邮件或者无用数据来赚快钱的公司？ Still, the paper contains essential insights which should frame discussion of data"s role in the economy. One concerns the imbalance of power in the market for data. That stems partly from concentration among big internet firms. But it is also because, though data may be extremely valuable in aggregate, an individual"s personal data typically are not. For one Facebook user to threaten to deprive Facebook of his data is no threat at all. So effective negotiation with internet firms might require collective action: and the formation, perhaps, of a “data-labour union”. 尽管如此，论文提出了数据在经济中的作用的 基本见解 。其中一点是目前数据市场权力的不平衡，这源于大部分的资源都集中在大型互联网公司手里。但是这也是因为数据只有在成规模的时候才有价值，单个的数据信息并没有那么有价值。比如说一个脸书的用户威胁他将从脸书上自己的数据，而这根本无法构成威胁。因此，同互联网公司进行有效谈判可能也得采取抱团的方式，也许通过‘数据劳工工会"这种形式比较合适。 This might have drawbacks. A union might demand too much in compensation for data, for example, impairing the development of useful AIs. It might make all user data freely available and extract compensation by demanding a share of firms" profits; that would rule out the pay-for-data labour model the authors see as vital to improving data quality. Still, a data union holds potential as a way of solidifying worker power at a time when conventional unions struggle to remain relevant. 但是工会的模式可能也有问题。例如，它可能会对于数据要价太高从而影响那些非常实用的人工智能技术的发展。它可能让所有用户的数据可以自由获取，但用户通过从企业收益中获取分成从而获得补偿。如果这样，无疑会毁掉数据付费使用这一劳动模式，而这种模式正是作者希望用来提升数据质量至关重要的一环。尽管如此，当传统工会难以保持利益相关性之时，数据工会依然可能成为保护劳动者权利的一种方式。 Most important, the authors" proposal puts front and centre the collective nature of value in an AI world. Each person becomes something like an oil well, pumping out the fuel that makes the digital economy run. Both fairness and efficiency demand that the distribution of income generated by that fuel should be shared more evenly, according to our contributions. The tricky part is working out how. 最重要的是，作者的建议将人工智能世界中价值的集体性质置于超前和中心的位置。 每个人都变成了一个“油井”，喷发出让数字经济运行的“石油”。公平和效率都要求根据贡献来更加均等地分配由我们生产的“石油”所产生的回报。理想很美好，但难的是如何将一切付诸行动。 References: [取经号]（ https://qujinghao.com/2018/01/27/5418/ ）

翻译如下，希望对你有用：首先，美国必须带头努力处理全球性经济不景气，通过其主导地位的国际货币基金，其重要作用，呼吁抵制保护主义的诱惑和刺激作用的巨大 政府支出 奥巴马计划。

The trouble with intangibles The Economist 2019-3-23 BABY-BOOMERS may recall, perhaps wistfully, how the golden-arched sign outside every McDonald"s restaurant would proclaim how many customers had been served by the chain. As they became adults, the number kept on climbing: 5bn in 1969; 30bn in 1979; 80bn in 1990. Jerry Seinfeld, a wry chronicler of the trivial, was moved to ask: “Why is McDonald"s still counting?” Do we really need to know about every last burger? Just put up a sign that says, “We"re doing very well.” The counting stopped. The signs said simply: “Billions and billions served”. If this seems unhelpfully vague, that is how the counting business sometimes is. Many of America"s biggest companies, including McDonald"s, report a negative book value, a gauge of a firm"s net assets. Many more have a book value that is small relative to their market value: their shares look dear on a price-to-book basis. Much of this is down to the complexity of valuing a firm"s assets in the digital age. But the result is that price-to-book is a bad guide to a stock"s true value. Stockpickers make a distinction between the price of a share and what it is truly worth. Price is a creature of fickle sentiment, of greed and fear. Value, in contrast, depends on a firm"s capabilities. There are various shorthand measures for this, but true “value” investors put the greatest store by the price-to-book ratio. It is the basis for inclusion in benchmarks such as the Russell value index. Countless studies have shown that buying stocks with a low price-to-book is a winning strategy. But not recently. For much of the past decade, value stocks have lagged behind the general market and a long way behind “growth” stocks, their antithesis. Perhaps this is because, as the industrial age gives way to the digital age, the intangible assets that increasingly matter are not easy to put a value on. The tangible world is easier. Factories, machines, land and office buildings count as capital assets on a firm"s books, because they will generate profits for many years. It is a fairly straightforward business to come up with a value for them: it is what the firm paid. This value is gradually written off (depreciated) over time to reflect wear and tear and obsolescence. Such fixed capital assets, along with current assets (cash, stocks of unsold goods, and so on) typically make up the bulk of book value. The problem is what it leaves out. These days, the value of a firm lies as much in its reputation, its processes, the know-how of staff and relationships with customers and suppliers as in tangible assets. Putting an accounting value on these intangibles is notoriously tricky. By their nature, they have unclear boundaries. Not every dollar of R&D or advertising spending can be ascribed to a well-defined asset, such as a brand or patent. That is in large part why, with a few exceptions, such spending is treated as a running cost, like rent or electricity. Increasingly price is detached from book value. The median price-to-book of S&P 500 stocks is 3.0. But plenty of well-known companies, whose competitive edge rests on brands or patents, have much higher ratios or even negative book values (see chart). McDonald"s has considerable brand value, which is not on its balance-sheet. It also has property assets that have been fully depreciated. The effect of mergers is to make things murkier. If, say, one firm pays 30m of tangible assets, the residual $70m is counted as an intangible asset—either as brand value, if that can be gauged, or as “goodwill”. That distorts comparisons. A firm that has acquired brands by merger will have those reflected in its book value, says Simon Harris, of GMO, a fund-management firm; a firm that has developed its own brands will not. Share buy-backs make things murkier still. For any firm with a price-to-book greater than one, a buy-back will diminish book by proportionately more than it lowers the value of outstanding stock. So price-to-book rises further. Some have called for accounting rules to change. But the more leeway a company has to turn day-to-day costs into capital assets, the more scope there is to fiddle with reported earnings. Better to spur the disclosure of spending that adds to intangible value. Analysts can then make their own judgments. Mr Harris finds that adjusting book value to reflect past R&D and advertising spending makes for more useful comparisons across stocks. It is not a perfect gauge. But no single measure—whether price-to-book or billions of customers served—can ever tell the whole story. Many of America"s biggest companies, including McDonald"s, report a negative book value 报告一个负的账面价值 Much of this is down to the complexity of valuing a firm"s assets in the digital age . be down to：是因为，由…造成的；在数字时代衡量公司资产的困难性 But the result is that price-to-book is a bad guide to a stock"s true value. 价格：账面价值 不是好的指标 Stockpickers make a distinction between the price of a share and what it is truly worth. 投资者（股票挑选者）对股票价格和实际价值进行区分 Price is a creature of fickle sentiment, of greed and fear. 价格是无常情绪的产物，是贪婪与恐惧的结果 Value, in contrast, depends on a firm"s capabilities. 相反，价值取决于公司的实际能力 对于价格和价值的描述，记一下 true “value” investors put the greatest store by the price-to-book ratio. Countless studies have shown that buying stocks with a low price-to-book is a winning strategy. 曾经，无数的研究表明，买低pb股票是盈利策略 value stocks have lagged behind the general market and a long way behind “growth” stocks, their antithesis . 没能跑过大盘；甩的远了；对立面 Perhaps this is because, as the industrial age gives way to the digital age , the intangible assets that increasingly matter are not easy to put a value on. 工业时代让步于数字时代；日渐重要的无形资产不好估值 The tangible world is easier. Factories, machines, land and office buildings count as capital assets on a firm"s books This value is gradually written off (depreciated) over time to reflect wear and tear and obsolescence. 折旧；磨损 These days, the value of a firm lies as much in its reputation, its processes, the know-how of staff and relationships with customers and suppliers as in tangible assets. 被忽视或不好估值的一些因素 Increasingly price is detached from book value. 分离 competitive edge rests on brands or patents 比较优势； The effect of mergers is to make things murkier . 混浊，弄不清楚；并购会导致估值更加困难 goodwill 一个公司的商誉信誉 fiddle with reported earnings 篡改、作假 Better to spur the disclosure of spending that adds to intangible value. 最好干嘛…；刺激公司对无形资产支出的披露 Mr Harris finds that adjusting book value to reflect past R&D and advertising spending makes for more useful comparisons across stocks . 调整账面价值，反映研发支出与广告投入；股票间的比较 But no single measure—whether price-to-book or billions of customers served—can ever tell the whole story.

Times 倒是各个年龄段的都有，因为通俗易懂，跟咱们的《读者》似的。Economist 跟咱们的《中国证券报》似的，你觉得除了做证券的人，学证券的人，会看他，并且可以看得懂，其他正常的人会看吗？美国孩子跟中国孩子都是一样的孩子。

因为在18年开设了China的报道板块

《经济学人》是一份由伦敦经济学人报纸有限公司出版的杂志，创办于1843年9月，创办人詹姆士·威尔逊。杂志的大多数文章写得机智，幽默，有力度，严肃又不失诙谐，并且注重于如何在最小的篇幅内告诉读者最多的信息。该杂志又以发明巨无霸指数闻名，是社会精英必不可少的读物。该杂志英文电子版可通过移动App、网站或者有声版阅读每周完整内容。 杂志主要关注政治和商业方面的新闻，但是每期也有一两篇针对科技和艺术的报导，以及一些书评。杂志中所有文章都不署名，而且往往带有鲜明的立场，但又处处用事实说话。主编们认为：写出了什么东西，比出自谁的手笔更重要。从2012年1月28日的那一期杂志开始《经济学人》杂志开辟了中国专栏，为有关中国的文章提供更多的版面。2018年12月，世界品牌实验室发布《2018世界品牌500强》榜单，经济学人排名第381。 基本介绍 中文名称 ：经济学人 外文名称 ：The Economist 语言 ：英语 类别 ：政治商业 创刊时间 ：1843年9月由詹姆士·威尔逊创办 出版周期 ：周刊 国际刊号 ：ISSN 0013-0613 邮发代号 ：US$5.95； 5.20； AUD$10.50； CAD$7.50 ；HK$60 官网 ：:economist/ 概述,销量,收入,特色,发展状况,定位,立场,中国, 概述 杂志最早于1843年9月由詹姆士·威尔逊创办，创办的目的是“参与一场推动前进的智慧与阻碍我们进步的胆怯无知之间的较量”，这句话被印在每一期《经济学人》杂志的目录页上。在杂志创刊之初，“经济主义”（economi *** ）意思是经济保守主义，但是今天该杂志无论是在经济还是政治上的立场都是倾向自由主义的，反对 *** 在经济和政治方面过度的介入。不过，不同的作者，当然立场也会有所不同。 销量 《经济学人》2007年的全球发行量据报导约为每期140万份，其中有半数销往北美洲，20%在欧洲大陆，15%在英国，10%在亚洲。《经济学人》有意识地将自己看作是一份国际性杂志，因此报导不仅仅局限于或偏重于英国或欧洲，因此其80%以上的读者是在英国以外地区。 收入 《经济学人》的发行人经济学人报纸有限公司是 经济学人 集团 的全资子公司，而经济学人集团则是一家私人企业，一半的股份由私人股东控股，另一半则由《金融时报》拥有。在2002年，经济学人集团的营业额达到2.27亿英镑，赢利1500万英镑。其收入大约一半来自读者订阅，另一半则是广告收入。 特色 《经济学人》又以发明巨无霸指数（Big Mac Index）而闻名，他们通过比较麦当劳在各国的快餐店销售巨无霸的价格来比较国与国之间的购买力平价。这个指数不仅有趣，而且被证明是十分准确的计算购买力评价的方法。2006年5月，《经济学人》纪念巨无霸指数创立20年，并指出美国不少政客不时滥用巨无霸指数。 发展状况 定位 《经济学人》读者定位为高收入、富有独立见解和批判精神的社会精英。杂志认为自己的读者都受过高等教育，因此对很多经济名词、专业术语，从不屑于做解释，比如“看不见的手”、“微经济理论”，有时候，大段地引用“法文”，使用拉丁语，也不翻译。 《经济学人》主要关注政治和商业方面的新闻，但是每期也有一两篇针对科技和艺术的报导，以及一些书评。除常规的新闻之外，每两周《经济学人》还会就一个特定地区或领域进行深入报导。 《经济学人》的主要读者群体是高级知识分子以及准备考研、考博的同学学习英语的阅读资料。在本科学生中，越来越多的同学也开始关注这份报纸,经济学人相比较于其他国内外语报纸的态度更客观，视角更宽。 立场 《经济学人》坚守超党派的立场，不怕得罪大人物，比如，出版的杂志中，有一期的封面标题是“托尼·布莱尔的末日”，“布希做对的唯一一件事”，用蒙着眼睛的公鸡代表法国的将来。 《经济学人》一直立场坚定，爱憎分明，支持同性恋婚姻，支持合法的“卖淫”，支持土耳其加入欧盟，支持免费的教育，支持私营组织探测宇宙的计画，倡议美国加强对枪枝的管理，反对死刑，反对一周工作35小时，反对英国规定工资的最低标准，反对任何场合条件下，对个体精神或者肉体上进行折磨。 中国 从2012年1月28日开始，英国《经济学人》杂志开辟了新的中国专栏，为有关中国的文章提供更多的版面。为了配合新专栏的开辟，2012年1月28日出版的《经济学人》杂志封面文章也是关于中国的，讨论了中国经济的发展模式及其转型。而在新开辟的专栏内，安排了六篇关于中国政治、经济、社会等方面的文章，包括云南的菸草与咖啡种植业、 *** 在经济生活中的角色、房地产行业等等。 2012年01月28日《经济学人》封面 以往的《经济学人》中，有关中国的文章一般安排在亚洲专栏内，每期杂志约有一两篇。 《经济学人》此前有六个专栏，分别是美国、美洲、亚洲、欧洲、中东/非洲以及英国，上一次该杂志专门为一个国家开辟专栏还是在1942年，为美国开辟的。本次的中国专栏也成为70年来该杂志开辟首个国家专栏，也是该杂志除英国和美国之外，开辟的第三个国家专栏。 《经济学人》编辑约翰·米克尔维特表示，该杂志一直在对中国进行深入报导，不过鉴于中国已经崛起成为一个拥有全球影响力的大国，应当为其开辟一个专属的栏目。这也能让该杂志有更多的空间来报导中国深刻的社会、政治和经济话题，尤其是北京和上海之外的中国广大地区。 2014年3月24日这期的《经济学人》罕见的在封面对中国著名小说家麦家直接夸赞，并点明其作品《解密》是“一部伟大的中文小说”，全文以“每个人都该读的中文小说”为标题，盛赞《解密》“是35年以来，最伟大的中文小说”。文章第一句话就说：“终于，出现了一部伟大的中文小说。”

经济学家是指拥有自己的经济学范式与原创的经济学基础理论的经济学人。有没有自己的经济学范式与原创的经济学基础理论是衡量一个经济学人是否经济学家的唯一标准。 基本介绍 中文名 ：经济学家 外文名 ：economist 定义 ：拥有原创的经济学理论的经济学人 提出者 ：陈世清 出处 ：《对称经济学》 定义,释义,奖项, 定义 经济学家是指拥有自己的经济学范式与原创的经济学基础理论的经济学人。有没有自己的经济学范式与原创的经济学基础理论是衡量一个经济学人是否经济学家的唯一标准。 释义 从科学学的意义上，有没有自己的经济学范式和原创的经济学基础理论才是衡量一个 “经济学家”是否真正的经济学家的唯一标准，而不是以某某诺贝尔经济学奖获得者的弟子、论文发表在哪一级的刊物上或论文引用率作为经济学家的标准。考虑到经济现象的复杂性，经济学家首先应该是思想家。能成为哲学家不一定能成为经济学家，不能成为哲学家则肯定不能成为经济学家。除了原创基础理论，以任何其他的标准作为衡量经济学家的标准都只是提出者以自身标准量身定做、贬低别人抬高自己以取得话语权的一种江湖手段;这种江湖手段与真正的科学精神格格不入，如果大行其道、泛滥成灾、潜移默化为学术界的潜规则，用这种潜规则替代科学发展与评判的显规则，必将搞乱人们的思想，造成科学标准的混乱，从而阻碍科学的发展。所以必须正本清源，重塑经济学发展与评判的科学标准。 实践不但是检验真理的唯一标准，而且是检验学术水平的唯一标准，衡量“经济学家”头衔含金量的原创基础理论标准与实践标准是统一的。如果说，有没有原创基础理论是检验是否真正的“经济学家”的唯一标准，那么实践是检验“经济学家”原创基础理论是否成立的唯一标准。所谓实践检验，就是“经济学家”原创基础理论对经济现象的解释能力、经济趋势的预测能力与经济问题的解决能力。经济学的发展逻辑与经济发展的逻辑是一致的；经济学范式转换的后面，是经济成长方式的转变与经济发展模式的转轨。经济学家应该为经济体制转型、经济发展模式转轨提供理论依据、理论指导、理论预见；如果原有的经济学范式不能解释这种转型与转轨，那么这种转型与转轨则意味着提出经济学范式转换的历史要求，作为经济学家就应该因势利导，义不容辞、责无旁贷地建立与这种转型与转轨相对称的新的经济学范式，并建构相应的哲学范式。如果说，哈佛经济学生罢课事件起因于全球金融危机，那么全球金融危机则说明了全球经济成长方式转变与经济发展模式转轨的必然性，也揭示了西方经济学范式转换的必然性。当全球经济成长方式的转变与经济发展模式的转轨要求转变经济学范式，而经济学家们仍然把旧的经济学范式视同神明、顶礼膜拜时，旧的经济学范式必然会对实践产生误导。所以，哈佛经济学生认为是曼昆教出来的经济学生带来了经济危机是正确的，英国女王2008年11月访问伦敦经济学院时问及“为什么没有人预见到信贷紧缩的到来”是正确的，英国社会科学院对女王难题的回答是最主要的原因在于“国内外诸多智者缺乏对危机的整体想像力不能将风险作为一个系统去理解”也是正确的。但正确不等于全面，更不等于深刻。每年发表在“国际顶级经济学期刊”上的论文汗牛充栋，竟然“缺乏对危机的整体想像力不能将风险作为一个系统去理解”，其根本原因不是西方经济学者缺乏想像力，而是西方经济学者的想像力受到西方经济学范式的限制，是西方经济学范式落后于全球经济成长方式转变与经济发展模式转轨的要求。如果整个范式落后，那么在同一个范式中的论文数学模型再精致，发表再多，发表论文的刊物级别再高，发表这些论文的刊物在西方经济学界的影响力再大，发表这些论文的“经济学家”的论文引用率在西方经济学界的排名再靠前，对于人类经济实践的指导作用也只能是南辕北辙，误国误民，不能预测、解释、解决全球金融危机是必然的。这样的“经济学家”只不过是纸上谈兵的“经济学家”，而不是既有与时俱进的原创基础理论、其原创基础理论又能指点迷津经世致用的真正意义上的经济学家——真正意义上的经济学家就是真正意义上的科学家。 但在日常生活中经济学家（英文：Economists）也指从事经济学理论研究及其套用工作的专家，其通常在经济领域做出过巨大贡献。 有时，针对不同的研究领域或者学派，通过添加定语而有不同的称呼。譬如，主要研究西方经济学的经济学家被称为“西方经济学家”，而研究马克思主义政治经济学的经济学家则被称之为“马克思主义经济学家”，还有“总量经济学家”、“个体经济学家”、“古典经济学家”、“跨领域经济学家”、“独立经济学家”等。 在各自的领域中也可以按照学科分支来称呼，例如，从事计量经济学的经济学家就被称之为计量经济学家。 奖项 诺贝尔经济学奖 诺贝尔经济学奖(The Nobel Economics Prize)，全称是纪念阿尔弗雷德·诺贝尔瑞典银行经济学奖(The Bank of Sweden Prizein Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel)，通常称为诺贝尔经济学奖，也称瑞典银行经济学奖。 诺贝尔经济学奖不属于诺贝尔遗嘱中所提到的五大奖励领域之一，而是由瑞典银行在1968年（戊申年）为纪念诺贝尔而增设的，其评选标准与其它奖项是相同的，获奖者由瑞典皇家科学院评选，1969年（该银行的300周年庆典）第一次颁奖，由挪威人弗里希和荷兰人丁伯根共同获得。 约翰·贝茨·克拉克奖 约翰·贝茨·克拉克奖（JohnBatesClarkMedal）俗称“小诺贝尔经济学奖”，由美国经济学会评选的，是经济学界除诺贝尔经济学奖外的另一项重要殊荣。 约翰·贝茨·克拉克奖由美国经济协会于1947年在美国经济协会创始人、协会第三任会长、著名经济学家约翰·贝茨·克拉克(1847—1938)诞辰100周年之际所设立的。目的在于纪念约翰·贝茨·克拉克提出的边际生产力理论与生产耗竭理论、和研究出根植于边际效用的需求理论。这个奖项1947年设立，每两年评选一次，入选的基本资格为在美国大学任教、40岁以下的学者。 亚当·斯密奖 全美商业经济学协会亚当·斯密奖(TheAdamSmithAwardofNABE)，是由全美商业经济学协会 亚当斯密 （NationalAssociationforBusinessEconomics，NABE)于1982年设立颁发。该奖项的评选是基于经济学家在经济领域的领导力及其提供的理念知识在工作政策上的实用性。每个获奖者将在全美商业经济学协会年会上发表一篇演讲。演讲稿将一些商业经济刊物上发表。 大卫·威尔兹经济学奖 哈佛大学设立的“大卫·威尔兹经济学奖”（DavidA.WellsPrizeinEconomics） 黄达-蒙代尔经济学奖 中国近30年的经济发展已形成了有别于西方市场经济体系的独特的中国市场经济模式，为经济理论的提炼与创新积累了许多新的素材，中国的“故事”已经吸引了不少西方学者的关注，因而构建这样一个平台，也为中国经济学界走向世界提供了契机。正是基于这样的考量，“黄达-蒙代尔经济学奖”应运而生。该奖项的前身为“黄达-蒙代尔优秀博士论文奖”，由1999年诺贝尔经济学奖得主“欧元之父”罗伯特·A·蒙代尔(Robert.AMundell)教授和我国著名经济学家、中国金融学会名誉会长、中国人民大学前校长黄达教授共同冠名，2002年12月由教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地---中国人民大学中国财政金融政策研究中心创设。每两年评选一次，逢单年颁奖，迄今已颁发三届，有15位青年学者获奖。为了进一步扩大该奖项的知名度和影响力，使评选结果更加公开公正透明，2005年该奖项正式更名为“黄达-蒙代尔经济学奖”(Mundell-HuangPrize)。 经济学家 中国经济学奖 中国经济学奖是目前国内第一个也是惟一一个授予个人、对个人长期成就进行奖励的经济学奖项，其宗旨在于通过奖励在经济理论、政策及研究方法等领域做出杰出贡献的中国学者。该奖被认为是中国经济学的“诺贝尔奖”，是中国目前规格最高的经济学奖项。中国经济学奖设立背景：中国经济学奖是由中国总量经济学会和中国经济体制改革研究会共同发起设立。 其宗旨在于通过奖励在经济理论、政策及研究方法等领域作出杰出贡献的中国学者，促进中国经济理论研究的繁荣和政策制定水平提高，普及经济领域基础知识，为我国经济的健康发展作出应有贡献。 孙冶方经济科学奖 孙冶方经济科学奖，是为纪念我国卓越的经济学家孙冶方同志对经济科学的重大贡献，表彰和奖励对经济科学做出突出贡献的集体和个人，推动中国经济科学的繁荣和发展而设立的。孙冶方经济科学奖于1985年开始设立和评选，每两年评选、颁发一次，是迄今为止中国经济学界的最高奖。 经济学家

被新的一期The Economist的社论的标题吸引，遂翻了这篇文章，谨供参考，欢迎交流观点，同时指正不足之处。 ALMOST 150 years after photovoltaic cells and wind turbines were invented, they still generate only 7% of the world"s electricity. 在太阳能光伏发电和风力涡轮发电技术问世将近150年后，它们依然只产生全球7%的电力。 Yet something remarkable is happening. From being peripheral to the energy system just over a decade ago, they are now growing faster than any other energy source and their falling costs are making them competitive with fossil fuels. 可有些令人瞩目的事情却在发生。十年前还是能源系统里微不足道的一部分，而现在它们比其他任何能源都发展的要快，不停降低的成本使得它们能够同化石燃料旗鼓相当。 BP, an oil firm, expects renewables to account for half of the growth in global energy supply over the next 20 years. It is no longer far-fetched to think that the world is entering an era of clean, unlimited and cheap power. About time, too. BP，一家石油公司，作出预期认为可再生能源将在接下来的20年内占到全球供能数量增长的一半。认为世界即将进入一个干净，无限且廉价能源的时代不再是不着边际的想法。同时，也该是时候了。 There is a $20trn hitch, though. To get from here to there requires huge amounts of investment over the next few decades, to replace old smog-belching power plants and to upgrade the pylons and wires that bring electricity to consumers. 然而，这还存在着一道200亿美刀的鸿沟。从现在的境地到理想的状态需要接下来的几十年中投入巨额的资金，来取代那些喷云吐雾的发电厂，同时将给消费者输送电力的电缆塔和电线进行更新换代。 Normally investors like putting their money into electricity because it offers reliable returns. Yet green energy has a dirty secret. The more it is deployed, the more it lowers the price of power from any source. 通常情况下投资者喜欢将他们的资金投入到电力产业中因为这会提供可靠的收益。 然而，绿色能源却有一个肮脏的秘密——它投入使用的越广泛，来自其他资源产生的能源的价格就将降得越低。 That makes it hard to manage the transition to a carbon-free future, during which many generating technologies, clean and dirty, need to remain profitable if the lights are to stay on. Unless the market is fixed, subsidies to the industry will only grow. 这使得向没有碳排放的未来的转型变得困难了，因为在这个过程中，许多供能的厂家，无论清洁与否，都需要保持盈利，如果灯还需要亮着的话。除非市场的问题解决了，给能源产业的补贴将只会继续增长。 Policymakers are already seeing this inconvenient truth as a reason to put the brakes on renewable energy. In parts of Europe and China, investment in renewables is slowing as subsidies are cut back. However, the solution is not less wind and solar. It is to rethink how the world prices clean energy in order to make better use of it. 政策的制定者已经看到了这个尴尬的事实，同样也将其作为缘由放缓了可再生能源的进一步投放。在欧洲和中国的部分地区，对可再生能源的投资正在放缓，而这正是因为补贴被降低了。然而，解决方法不是减少风或者太阳能，还是去重新思考世界应当如何去给清洁能源定价，进而更好的发挥它的作用。 At its heart, the problem is that government-supported renewable energy has been imposed on a market designed in a different era. 问题的中心在于政府所支持的可再生能源，被投放在了一个与之时代上不相同步的市场里。 For much of the 20th century, electricity was made and moved by vertically integrated, state-controlled monopolies. 20世纪的大多数时间，电力产业都被垂直一体化的国有垄断企业所生产，运输。 From the 1980s onwards, many of these were broken up, privatised and liberalised, so that market forces could determine where best to invest. 从1980s开始，许多这些垄断企业都被分解，私有化或解体了，进而市场力量可以决定哪儿是最好的投资方向。 Today only about 6% of electricity users get their power from monopolies. Yet everywhere the pressure to decarbonise power supply has brought the state creeping back into markets. 今天只有6%的用户从垄断企业获取电力，然而无处不在的对无碳排放能源的需求使得国家不得不走回原先市场化的道路。 **This is disruptive for three reasons. ** 而这件事情将是极具破坏性的，有三个原因。 The first is the subsidy system itself. The other two are inherent to the nature of wind and solar: their intermittency and their very low running costs. 首先是补贴体系自身，另外二者则关于风力和太阳能的本质：它们的间歇性以及极低的运作成本。 All three help explain why power prices are low and public subsidies are addictive. 如上三点解释了为什么能源价格非常低然而公众补贴却仍然是不可或缺的。 First, the splurge of public subsidy, of about $800bn since 2008, has distorted the market. It came about for noble reasons—to counter climate change and prime the pump for new, costly technologies, including wind turbines and solar panels. 第一，公众补贴的随意挥霍，自08年起的约8亿美刀，已经扰乱了市场。它投放时打着高尚的旗号——为了抵制气候变化并且要采取措施促使新兴且昂贵的科技，包括风力涡轮和太阳能光伏技术的发展。 But subsidies hit just as electricity consumption in the rich world was stagnating because of growing energy efficiency and the financial crisis. The result was a glut of power-generating capacity that has slashed the revenues utilities earn from wholesale power markets and hence deterred investment. 但是补贴入市的时机恰好是发达世界中电力消费因逐渐提高的能源效率以及经济危机而遭遇滞涨的时刻。 Second, green power is intermittent. The vagaries of wind and sun—especially in countries without favourable weather—mean that turbines and solar panels generate electricity only part of the time. To keep power flowing, the system relies on conventional power plants, such as coal, gas or nuclear, to kick in when renewables falter. But because they are idle for long periods, they find it harder to attract private investors. So, to keep the lights on, they require public funds. 第二，绿色能源是间歇性的。风和太阳的不可预测性——尤其是在没有有力天气情况的国家——意味着涡轮和光伏电板仅仅只能部分时间产生电力。为了保证能源的供应，这个系统还需要依赖传统的发电方式，比如煤，天然气或者是核能，在可再生能源无法工作的时候接手。但是正因为可再生能源的长期搁置，它们很难能够吸引到私人投资者。所以，为了能够持续供电，它们需要公共的资金支持。 Everyone is affected by a third factor: renewable energy has negligible or zero marginal running costs—because the wind and the sun are free. In a market that prefers energy produced at the lowest short-term cost, wind and solar take business from providers that are more expensive to run, such as coal plants, depressing power prices, and hence revenues for all. 每个人都被第三个因素所影响：可再生能源有着微乎其微甚至可以不计的边际运作成本——因为风能和太阳能是免费的。在一个倾向于短期能源生产成本最低的市场中，风能和太阳能从供应商手中接手过来运营成本更高的供电方式比如火力发电厂，进而压低供能价格，造福整个市场。 注释：我个人对该段的理解是，从短期上来说，新能源收益是非常低的，进而没有投资者愿意投资建厂来提供新能源，这是供不足；而现在越来越多的人有保护环境的意识，进而有对绿色清洁能源的需求，导致需求大，供需之间有缺口，政府却通过给传统能源提供补助的方式来促使人们使用传统能源而非清洁能源，进而有了“清洁能源从供应商手中接过运营成本更高。。。进而造福整个市场”（因为它间接性的拉低了其他能源的供应价格） The higher the penetration of renewables, the worse these problems get—especially in saturated markets. In Europe, which was first to feel the effects, utilities have suffered a “lost decade” of falling returns, stranded assets and corporate disruption. 可再生能源渗透的越深，这些问题就会变得越严重——尤其是在饱和的市场中。欧洲已经首先感受到了这些影响，公用事业已经遭受了一个“失落的十年”——收益下降，资产滞胀以及企业破产。 Last year, Germany"s two biggest electricity providers, E.ON and RWE, both split in two. In renewable-rich parts of America power providers struggle to find investors for new plants. Places with an abundance of wind, such as China, are curtailing wind farms to keep coal plants in business. 去年，德国两家最大的电力公司，E.ON和RWE，都分裂成了两家。在可再生能源盛行的地区，美国的能源供应商努力寻找投资商开设新的电厂。有充足风力的地区，比如中国，都已经雪藏了风力发电厂，以保持火力发电厂的运营。 The corollary is that the electricity system is being re-regulated as investment goes chiefly to areas that benefit from public support. 必然的结果就是电力系统正在被重新设立规则，伴随着投资大部分流向能够从公共补贴中收益的区域。 Paradoxically, that means the more states support renewables, the more they pay for conventional power plants, too, using “capacity payments” to alleviate intermittency. In effect, politicians rather than markets are once again deciding how to avoid blackouts. 矛盾的是，这也意味着支持可再生能源的国家越多，他们支付给传统发电厂的也越多，因为他们用“支付能力”来缓解可再生能源的间歇性问题。实际上，是政客而非市场在又一次在选择如何规避停电的发生。 They often make mistakes: Germany"s support for cheap, dirty lignite caused emissions to rise, notwithstanding huge subsidies for renewables. 他们却又总是犯错误：德国支持廉价的能源，引擎点火导致的污染排放却增加了，尽管为可再生能源发放了巨额的补贴。 Without a new approach the renewables revolution will stall. The good news is that new technology can help fix the problem. 没有新办法的话，可再生能源的改革将要停滞了。而好消息是新的科技将帮助解决这个问题。 Digitalisation, smart meters and batteries are enabling companies and households to smooth out their demand—by doing some energy-intensive work at night, for example. 数字化，智能电表以及电池都在帮助企业和家庭缓和他们的需求——通过例如将能源密集型的工作放在夜晚。 This helps to cope with intermittent supply. Small, modular power plants, which are easy to flex up or down, are becoming more popular, as are high-voltage grids that can move excess power around the network more efficiently. 这有效解决了间歇性供应的问题。同时易于上下弯曲的小型模块化发电厂正在变得十分流行，能够使得更多额外能源更有效的在电路网络中运行的高压系统网络亦然。 The bigger task is to redesign power markets to reflect the new need for flexible supply and demand. They should adjust prices more frequently, to reflect the fluctuations of the weather. 更大的任务是重新设计能源供给市场，以反应对灵活的供需关系的需要。他们应当更为频繁的调整价格，以反应天气的变化。 At times of extreme scarcity, a high fixed price could kick in to prevent blackouts. Markets should reward those willing to use less electricity to balance the grid, just as they reward those who generate more of it. 在极度稀缺的年代，一个高昂的固定价格能够很好的起到防止市场崩溃的作用。市场应当奖励那些愿意用更少的电的人，来调控市场，正如它们奖励那些生产的更多的人。 Bills could be structured to be higher or lower depending how strongly a customer wanted guaranteed power all the time—a bit like an insurance policy. In short, policymakers should be clear they have a problem and that the cause is not renewable energy, but the out-of-date system of electricity pricing. Then they should fix it. 账单价格的高低可以根据客户有多想要无时无刻供应的稳定的能源来制定，有一点像保险的售卖政策。总而言之，政策的制定者应当明确他们目前面临着一个问题并且这问题的原因不是可再生能源，而是早已过时的电力价格机制。他们应该修复这问题。 写在文末的一些感想：这篇文章提出的一些问题确实值得我们思考，比如中国将风力发电弃之不用，目的是为了火力发电厂的持续运作。这的确是我们国家，甚至是全球都需要面对的问题，在转型期间，原有的能源结构如何平稳的过渡，how to get to there from here，在考虑可持续发展的长远目标的同时，又要如何控制住当下的成本，维持经济发展，的确是很棘手的问题。我们不可能违背客观规律，那么可能正如文中所提出的，要么从价格机制上予以调控，要么，就寄希望于科技，改变我们的未来吧。